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Environmental Law-National Environmental Policy
Act-Potential Environmental Effects Of Urban Unemployment
Require Preparation Of An Environmental Impact Statement.
City of Rochester v. United States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967 (2d
Cir. 1976).
The City of Rochester and the Genessee-Finger Lakes Regional
Planning Board sued to enjoin the Postal Service from constructing
a 12 million dollar postal facility in a Rochester suburb, in contem-
plation of abandoning an older smaller facility within the city itself.'
Plaintiffs asserted that the Postal Service's change of location was
"a major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, "I and that the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA)3 required the preparation of an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS)4 before the Service could abandon its inner
city facility.' While conceding that the transfer was "a major Fed-
eral action," defendants countered that the transfer did not
"significantly affec[t] the quality of the human environment.",
1. City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 971 (2d Cir. 1976).
2. Id. at 970.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
4. Id. § 4332(2)(c). The breadth of this section is the crux of the issue in all of the cases
discussed herein. The section reads as follows:
JAII agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . (C) include in every recommen-
dation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented. Prior to making any detailed
statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments
of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect
to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments
and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized
to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the Presi-
dent, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section
552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
processes;
Id. (emphasis added).
5. 541 F.2d at 974.
6. Id. at 973.
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They based their contention upon a private Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) prepared by Postal Service consulting architects
which concluded that no adverse environmental effects would be
caused by the transfer.7 Therefore, defendants argued, no EIS was
necessary. The District Court dismissed the complaint, ruling inter
alia that the plaintiffs' injury resulting from the abandonment of
the Rochester post office was social and economic rather than envi-
ronmental .'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the Postal
Service's action would have environmental consequences.' It criti-
cized the Service's EIA for considering only the effects of the new
construction on the suburb of Henrietta, while ignoring the conse-
quences of abandonment on the city of Rochester.' 0 The court specif-
ically noted that the move could result in Rochester residents losing
their jobs, thus contributing to the economic and physical deteriora-
tion of downtown Rochester." It indicated that an action by a fed-
eral agency causing the loss of a large number of employment oppor-
tunities within a community must be accompanied by an EIS. 12 The
court preliminarily enjoined the transfer of mail processing activi-
ties and Postal Service employees from Rochester to Henrietta
pending the preparation and filing of an EIS.'3
The general purpose of NEPA is to prevent the abuse of the envi-
ronment." Legislative history indicates that Congress promulgated
the EIS provision to force compliance with NEPA by requiring fed-
eral agencies to file a written evaluation of the potential environ-
mental impacts of their proposals.'" However the legislative history
7. Id.
8. Id. at 971.
9. Id. at 973.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 973-74.
13. Id. at 979. The court was "reluctantly forced to conclude" that the plaintiffs were
barred from enjoining the construction of the new Henrietta facility because of the overriding
economic waste which would result from such an injunction. Id. at 977. The district court
had found that at the time the suit was begun, the Henrietta mail facility was 18 per cent
complete and approximately 8 million dollars had been spent not including the 1.6 million
dollar cost of the site. Id. at 971 n.3. However the court stated that absent laches, it would
have been proper for the district court to enjoin the construction of the new facility. Id. at
977.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
15. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 19009-10, 40416, 40419 (1969).
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contains no discussion of whether indirect environmental effects
could trigger the EIS provision or whether the deterioration of phys-
ical surroundings resulting from adverse socio-economic impacts is
a significant environmental effect activating the EIS mandate of
NEPA.1'
Anticipating that NEPA's mandate for preparing an EIS might
be too ambiguous, the Council on Environmental Equality (CEQ) 7
established guidelines to aid federal agencies in preparing an EIS.15
Section 1500.6 of the guidelines defines "major actions significantly
affecting the environment"' 9 to include secondary or indirect envi-
ronmental impacts. 0 In spite of these guidelines the court opinions
conflict on the question of whether indirect environmental effects
alone can trigger the EIS provision. Some courts view the unem-
ployment created by federal action similar to that in Rochester as
a social and economic problem regardless of the environmental re-
percussions, and therefore find NEPA and its EIS provisions inappl-
16. The legislative history describes the general purpose of NEPA, and more specifically,
the purpose of section 102 rather than actual applications of the section. See S. REP. No. 296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in 11969]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751; H.R. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2767; 115 CONG. REC. (1969). House Report 765 is the
report of a joint Senate-House conference which was formed to resolve the differences between
the environmental policy bill originally passed by the Senate (S.1075) and the one originally
passed by the House (H.R.12549). 115 CONG. REc. 26591, 28176, 29006, 29089 (1969).
17. The Council on Environmental Quality was established by the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1969, § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). Duties and activities of the Council,
which is part of the Executive Office, include reviewing and appraising federal government
programs designed to further the purpose of NEPA and making recommendations to the
President regarding these programs. Id. §§ 4342, 4344(3).
18. Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-
.14 (1976). Portions of these guidelines were first published in 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971)
and are sporadically supplemented by the Council. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.14(a) (1976).
19. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1976).
20. Id. § 1500.6(b). "Significant effects also include secondary effects. Id.
Secondary or indirect, as well as primary or direct, consequences for the environment
should be included in [Environmental Impact Statements]. Many major Federal
actions . . . stimulate or induce secondary effects in the form of. . .changed patterns
of social and economic activities. Such secondary effects, through their impacts on
existing community facilities and activities, through inducing new facilities and activi-
ties, or through changes in natural conditions, may often be even more substantial
than the primary effects of the original action itself.
Id. § 1500.8(a)(3)(ii). Furthermore, Appendix II of the guidelines lists Neighborhood Charac-
ter and Continuity as an area of environmental impact. Id. App. II. To consider the effects
of abandonment on the Rochester community, environmental effects, is certainly consistent
with these guidelines.
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icable.2 ' Other courts view the environmental repercussions of un-
employment as indirect environmental effects of the agency action
and enforce the EIS mandate."2
Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld"3 involved the closing of a United States
Army base which resulted in the transfer of military personnel and
a corresponding reduction in the number of available civilian jobs
in the local community." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that the reduction in employment opportunities was not a
major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment and therefore no EIS was required. 5 The court
reasoned that Congress did not intend socio-economic consequences
of an agency action to come within the scope of NEPA,25 since con-
gressional history was silent on this point. 7 Furthermore, the Sixth
Circuit found the adverse economic effects of the base closure tem-
porary," and pointed out that temporary impacts are not ordinarily
considered significant under NEPA. 5 The court also distinguished
21. See, e.g., Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S.
1061 (1977); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa.
1976); IMAGE of Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld, 9 ENVIR. REP. 1183 (W.D. Tex. 1976)
(BNA). Cf. Township of Dover v. United States Postal Serv., 429 F. Supp. 295 (D. N.J. 1977).
In Dover, Judge Barlow's view of the problem differs slightly from that of the other courts
listed above. He focuses on whether the action proposed by the federal agency is an action
within NEPA's zone of interest. Id. at 296. However this view is erroneous because NEPA is
clearly concerned with the environmental impacts of federal actions and not with the actions
themselves. 42 U.S.C. § § 4332, 4331. Furthermore Dover is factually distinguishable from the
other cases discussed in this casenote because the Postal Service's transfer had minimal
environmental effects if any. First, the transfer only involved 120 employees; second, the
employees were transferred from a suburban township not prone to urban deterioration; and
third, the Dover postal facility was not being abandoned but only losing one of its functions.
429 F. Supp. at 297-98.
22. City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976); Prince
George's County, Md. v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975); McDowell v. Schlesin-
ger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
23. 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
24. Id. at 865.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 866. The court did not describe what the environmental repercussions of the
Army base closing would be, but merely dismissed them as beyond the scope of NEPA. Id.
See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
27. See note 16 supra.
28. 537 F.2d at 865-66.
29. Several sections of NEPA suggest that the Act is concerned primarily with long-term
rather than short-term environmental effects. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(a)-(b), 4332(2)(C)(iv)-
(v) (1970). See also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (1976). However, this court's determination that such
economic factors and their environmental consequences are short-term is questionable in
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cases which held that the environmental repercussions of socio-
economic impacts trigger the EIS provision.'" It noted that the fed-
eral agency actions in those cases had both a direct impact on the
environment and the more remote environmental consequences of
the socio-economic effects." In Breckinridge, the court found only
indirect environmental effects and concluded that these effects
alone were insufficient to warrant an EIS.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania employed a similar rationale in National Association of
Government Employees v. Rumsfeld.Y2 Government employees and
the city of Philadelphia sought to enjoin the closing of an Army
arsenal. They charged that the closing would result in the elimina-
tion of 3,500 civilian jobs in Philadelphia.33 The court granted the
federal government's motion to dismiss, holding that the applica-
tion of NEPA to these facts was clearly beyond congressional in-
tent.3" Moreover, it stated that the more remote environmental con-
sequences stemming from social and economic injury could be con-
sidered in an EIS only if the agency's action also had more direct
environmental impacts which independently triggered NEPA's
application.35 To support its decision, the court cited IMAGE of
Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld, 5 where the Defense Depart-
ment's action would have reduced the number of civilian employees
light of the decisions requiring an EIS under similar circumstances. City of Rochester v.
United States Postal Serv., 541 F.2d 967, 977 (2d Cir. 1976) (potential effects of the Service's
transfer of employees termed irreparable); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221, 236-
37, 244 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (the court describes the long-term effects of the Defense Depart-
ment's decision to transfer an Air Force unit).
30. 537 F.2d at 866. The court distinguished the following cases on the grounds that there
was a primary environmental basis for requiring an EIS independent of the socio-economic
factors in each of them: Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'ns. v. United States Postal Serv., 516 F.2d
378 (2d Cir. 1975); Minnesota Pub. Interest Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974);
Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.) cert. denied sub nom, Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409
U.S. 990 (1972).
31. 537 F.2d at 866.
32. 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
33. Id. at 1303.
34. Id. at 1306.
35. Id. The opinion indicates that the court realized the severity of the social and eco-
nomic blows to the community but simply did not consider them within the zone of interest
of NEPA. Id. at 1304. Cf. Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1061 (1977).
36. 9 ENVIR. REP. 1183 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (BNA).
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at a military base. 7 In IMAGE, the district court refused to permit
plaintiff employees "by 'linguistics' and 'etymology' to stretch
[NEPA's] coverage to embrace their own parochial interests
... "38 It stated that Congress did not intend NEPA to be a
"National Employment Policy Act."39
Contrary to the holdings in Breckinridge and National
Association, some courts have extended NEPA to situations where
an action by a federal agency resulted primarily in a reduction of
local employment opportunities.4 0 In McDowell v. Schlesinger,4' the
earliest case discussing the need for an EIS on a federal agency
proposal to reassign and relocate personnel, Judge Elmo B. Hunter
examined in detail the relationship between the socio-economic and
environmental consequences of an air base closing on the com-
munity." He noted that the relocation would overcrowd the housing
market in the abandoned community and that such a large number
of vacant homes would invite increased vandalism with attendant
law enforcement and fire hazard problems.43 Additionally, he found
that the base closing would decrease the tax base of the community
resulting in a possible cutback in government services.44 The court
considered the loss of approximately 700,000 dollars in federal im-
pact aid funds to the school districts of the affected community and
the direct salary loss to residents amounting to 35 million dollars.45
Although the loss of employment to the overall metropolitan area
was negligible, Judge Hunter concluded that the anticipated effect
on the local community was "devastating"; therefore an EIS was
necessary.4" The court stated that: "while such secondary impacts
may be generally insufficient by themselves to significantly affect
the quality of the human environment, so as to require an EIS, there
are circumstances in which such impacts . . . may be sufficient."47
37. Id. at 1183-84.
38. Id. at 1187.
39. Id.
40. See note 22 supra.
41. 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
42. Id. at 235-37, 254.
43. Id. at 236.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 234.
46. Id. at 235-36.
47. Id. at 245-46.
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Prior to Rochester, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
never dealt specifically with the issue of whether socio-economic
impacts leading to urban decay were significant environmental ef-
fects within the meaning of NEPA's EIS provision. However, in City
of New York v. United States,4" the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York acknowledged that economic injury could lead
to environmental damage. New York City and New York State had
sued to annul an authorization by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) permitting abandonment of a financially failing rail-
road by a private company. Plaintiffs claimed that the Commission
had failed to compile an EIS as required by NEPA before issuing
the authorization.4" In evaluating the necessity of an EIS, the court
noted that abandonment of the railroad might lead industrial
freight shippers to move from the city, thus injuring the plaintiffs
economically and leading to urban blight." Nevertheless, the court
remanded the matter to the ICC for further consideration on the
basis of the simultaneous direct environmental effects rather than
the indirect environmental consequences stemming from the eco-
nomic injury.5'
In Rochester,"2 the court found that the postal facility's move from
48. 337 F. Supp. 150 (three judge court) (E.D.N.Y.), remanded, 344 F. Supp. 929
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (three judge court).
49. 337 F. Supp. at 158.
50. Id. at 159, 162. Although the opinion was not explicit on this point, the following
excerpts demonstrate that the court was aware of the environmental consequences of the
possible unemployment resulting from the railroad users' departure:
[Mluch of the protestants' argument at the hearing and in their exceptions was not
that users would turn to trucks but rather that they would move away as soon as their
leases expire, or perhaps even before. Whatever the merits of these opposing views, it
is apparent that there is likely to be some adverse environmental effect as a result of
the abandonment.
Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
To be sure, the precise consequences for the City, its economy, and its people are not
readily ascertainable; but the Railroad's demise will undoubtedly be followed by the
relocation of at least some users with the attendant loss of jobs for employees, loss of
business for the users'suppliers and customers, and ultimately both the economic and
physical deterioration in the local community.
Id. at 162 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 155, 158, 159 & n.10, 160-64.
52. 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976). Rochester differs from most of the earlier cases dealing
with the same question in that it involved a non-military agency. Cf. the cases cited in note
61, infra. However any distinctions among the functions of federal agencies taking major
actions affecting the environment are unimportant in determining whether an EIS is neces-
sary.
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Rochester to Henrietta would result in the transfer of approximately
1,400 employees.53 The court further found that the transfer of em-
ployees5
could have several substantial environmental effects, including ... (2)(a)
loss of job opportunities for inner-city residents who cannot afford or other-
wise manage to commute by car or bus to the HMF site, or (b) their moving
to the suburbs, either possibly leading ultimately [to] both economic and
physical deterioration in the [downtown Rochester] community; ....
(emphasis supplied)."
Rochester extends the scope of NEPA's EIS mandate. The pri-
mary problems associated with the Postal Service's abandonment
of its inner city facility are social and economic.5" However these
problems in turn generate secondary environmental problems:
urban pollution if the Rochester residents commute to Henrietta;
urban deterioration if they move to Henrietta57 or remain in Roches-
ter but lose their employment. The importance of the Rochester
opinion is that these derivative, more remote environmental effects
trigger the EIS mandate." Thus the Second Circuit indicates that
There are basically two relevant stages to enacting an agency proposal. At the first, the
agency decides whether an EIS is required; at the second, it decides whether or not to follow
through with the proposal despite the environmental consequences revealed by the EIS.
At the earlier stage, the agency's focus is on the environmental effects alone, regardless of
the reasons the agency may have for its action. Only later, when the agency is deciding in
light of its EIS whether to put its proposal into action, does the purpose of the proposal, and
more indirectly the agency's overall function, become important in counterbalancing any
adverse environmental effects. Solely at this later stage would it be reasonable to view a
Defense Department transfer, pertaining to national security, differently from a United
States Postal Service transfer. See note 63 infra.
53. 541 F.2d at 973.
54. Id.
55. Although the court employs the word "substantial" rather than "significant" in de-
scribing the environmental impacts of the loss of employment it clearly intends "substantial"
to satisfy the significance requirement of section 4332(2)(C) of NEPA. Id. at 973, 978 n.14.
56. NEPA's provision typically is applied to situations where environmental damage,
rather than social or economic injury would be the primary effect of a federal agency's
proposal. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir.
1974); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
57. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the court's opinion how the move to Henrietta by
Rochester residents would cause urban deterioration. Perhaps the flight of residents from a
neighborhood made undesirable by the postal facility's closing would result in the abandon-
ment of local housing.
58. The EIS provision applies to any major action of a federal agency, including federal
approval of the decisions of private industry. See City of New York v. United States, 337 F.
Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) and text accompanying notes 48-51 supra. Considering the scope
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loss of employment opportunities leading to environmental deterio-
ration is a sufficiently significant environmental effect to activate
the EIS mandate of NEPA.59
It is important that the court chose to be explicit in labeling loss
of employment leading to urban decay a substantial environmen-
tal effect when it could have ignored the question altogether as it
did in City of New York. 0 Perhaps the Second Circuit felt it neces-
sary to decide this issue because it had recently arisen in other
federal courts.6
The main purpose of an EIS is to force federal agencies to consider
the environment in making their decisions 2 and to maximize en-
deavors to seek less environmentally damaging methods of accom-
plishing their goals. 3 The Rochester decision permits the EIS provi-
of federal regulation of private industry, the Rochester opinion has broad implications. Pre-
sumably federal authorization of a proposal by a private company which might result in local
unemployment would require the preparation of an EIS.
59. 541 F.2d at 973. The court stated:
The transfer of 1,400 employees alone could have several substantial environmental
effects, including (1) increasing commuter traffic by car between the in-city residents
of the employees and their new job site .. .2(a) loss of job opportunities for inner-
city residents who cannot afford or otherwise manage, to commute by car or bus to
the [Henrietta] site, or (b) their moving to the suburbs, either possibly leading
"ultimately [to] both economic and physical deterioration in the [downtown Roches-
ter] community," cf. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.y.
1972) (three judge court); and (3) partial or complete abandonment of the downtown
[facility] which could, one may suppose, contribute to an atmosphere of urban decay
and blight, making environmental repair of the surrounding area difficult if not infeasi-
ble.
Id. The Rochester court finds that an EIS is also required under section 102(2)(B) of NEPA.
541 F.2d at 974. This section requires federal agencies to establish procedures to insure that
environmental values are considered in its decision-making process. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B).
60. 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). In Rochester the court could have ordered an EIS
on the basis of more obviously environmental effects without declaring loss of employment
leading to urban deterioration a substantial environmental effect under NEPA. 541 F.2d at
973.
61. Breckinridge v. Rumsfeld, 537 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061
(1977); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 418 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa.. 1976);
IMAGE of Greater San Antonio v. Rumsfeld, 9 ENVIR. REP. 1183 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (BNA);
McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Prince George's County, Md.
v. Holloway, 404 F. Supp. 1181 (D.D.C. 1975).
62. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a)(1976); 115 CONG. Rac. 19009-10, 40416, 40419 (1969).
63. Obviously the issuance of an adequate environmental impact statement prior to any
final decision by the agency on a proposal does not necessarily mean that the agency action
will be prohibited. See City of New York v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The CEQ guidelines themselves refer to this important distinction at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(b)
(1976) which states: "Significant effects can also include actions which may have both benefi-
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sion to fulfill its purpose. Consideration of the environmental conse-
quences of socio-economic effects is consistent with the broad pur-
pose of NEPA "to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health
and welfare of man . . . ." Ordinarily, environmental factors are
balanced against the economic and technical advantages of an
agency action. 5 But where adverse environmental factors are caused
by a primary economic injury, both economic and environmental
considerations oppose the agency action. It is in exactly these cir-
cumstances that an agency action would be most questionable and
EIS most beneficial because the EIS forces the agency to examine
for itself and the community" all potential, though indirect, envi-
ronmental consequences of its tentative action.
Elizabeth Manning
cial and detrimental effects, even if on balance the agency believes that the effect will be
beneficial." Id. See note 52 supra.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
65. Id. §§ 4321-4347 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975); See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-
.14 (1976).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) and (G), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975); 115 CONG. REc. 19009,
19011, 40416 (1969).
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